Non-obligatory forgiveness: Supererogatory or impermissible? by Anderson, Rhonda
Non-obligatory Forgiveness: Supererogatory or 
Impermissible? 
Rhonda Anderson 
University of Saskatchewan 
Traditionally, forgiveness has been considered a virtue, and 
instances of forgiving positive. David Heyd, in his 1982 work 
Supererogation, contends that "forgiveness is not always 
obligatory."! While acknowledging that all acts of forgiveness are 
good, he differentiates between those acts of forgiveness which 
are a duty and those which are not. To Heyd, any act of forgiveness 
that is not obligatory must be supererogatory. As it stands, Heyd's 
account of forgiveness is persuasive. Nevertheless, he overlooks 
the possibility that an act of forgiveness that is not obligatory might 
be impermissible rather than supererogatory. 
Heyd's description of forgiveness contains few surprises. 
Forgiveness is a reaction to an insult or injury and as such, is an 
alternative to continued resentment. 2 Generally, forgiving is 
confined to personal relationships, and includes the restoration of 
such a personal relationship after a disruption. Undoubtedly, Heyd 
would insist that resuming the personal relationship involve 
sincerity rather than show; therefore, forgiveness requires a change 
of feeling or point of view that would effect the required restoration. 
Most importantly, forgiveness "presupposes recognition by both 
parties of the wrongness of the action and its agent's responsibility" 
(157). He considers non-obligatory forgiveness as supererogatory 
forbearance, that is, relinquishing one's right or taking less than 
one's share. Forbearance involves doing more than "is required by 
1 David Heyd, Supererogation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982) 
159. Further references to this text will be cited parenthetically within the essay . 
2 The OED defines resentment as "an indignant sense of injury or insult received, 
or of wrong or affront done to some person or thing to which one is attached." An 
obsolete definition is "an appreciation or understanding of something." I would 
suggest that the second definition is implied because resentment involved the 
recognition that one has been deliberately injured or insulted. 
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the natural duties of mutual help, concern for others, friendliness, 
and respect" (153). 
Heyd does not clarify which acts of forgiveness are obligatory. 
Although he states that one ought to forgive when one is entitled to 
harbor resentment for only a short period of time, he does not define 
any specific criterion for how this time period is to be decided. He 
also allows that "some people would wish to argue that resentment 
is never justified if the offender has sincerely asked to be forgiven. 
For such people, forgiveness is supererogatory only when granted 
without being asked for" (159). His evoking of "some people" 
implies his dissociation from such a group. However, one is then 
left with no practical guidelines as to what Heyd would accept as 
generating the duty of forgiveness. 
One might ask why "some people" hold forgiving to be a duty 
in the case of the offender's asking to be forgiven. To suggest that 
such an offender has a right to forgiveness seems contrary to 
intuition. Can every (or even any) injury or insult, followed by a 
sincere apology, create such a right? Here, Heyd's remarks on the 
relation between duty and rights could provide enlightenment. He 
contends that "many philosophers have conclusively shown [that] 
not every duty has a corresponding right, i.e. an act may be 
obligatory even if no one has a 'right' over it" (120). Further, 
supererogation cannot be identified with the area of duty which 
lacks corresponding rights "for there are various kinds of duties 
that do not correspond to rights—some of which have no relation 
to supererogation" (120). Perhaps repentance creates a good reason 
for, rather than a right, to forgiveness. By asking to be forgiven, 
the offender would seem to be saying that the sinner is not the sin. 
Seen in this light, the sinner joins the victim in condemning the 
offending act. In such a case, forgiveness may become a duty, 
performed in the interest of justness and fairness. 
If forgiveness in the case of repentance is a duty, despite the 
lack of a corresponding right, then the obligation must rest on good 
reasons; perhaps the offender deserves to be forgiven even though 
he or she has no right to such forgiveness. How is one to decide? In 
his 1988 article entit led "Moral Subjects , F reedom, and 
Idiosyncrasy," Heyd advances the notion of idiosyncratic reasons 
which, he says, is consistent with his remarks in Supererogation. 
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His position is that "idiosyncratic reasons, though not derived from 
the model [of a moral theory] may still be considered rational in 
light of a plan, a scheme, or a project that is part of a person's life 
and identity."3 Such reasons come into play in three areas: forming 
the basis for choosing a moral point of view (adopting a moral 
model); governing the way in which moral reasons are applied in 
practice (within a model); and forming the basis for choosing to 
act in a supererogatory way (transcending a moral model) .At times, 
features of an agent 's character or circumstances become 
idiosyncratic reasons having moral relevance. To this agent, these 
reasons are binding on himself or herself, but not on other moral 
agents. These reasons can relate to the context of the situation 4 or 
can "take into account the particular character and identity either 
of the agent or of the beneficiary of the action (or of both)."5 
Consequently, "we may forgive a friend without binding ourselves 
to forgive an enemy; we are permitted to have personal biases in 
selecting the beneficiaries of our supererogatory conduct." 6 
However, although one may be, as he contends, acting on 
idiosyncratic reasons, it is unclear whether this reasoning is taking 
place within the model or transcending it. 
Heyd contends that forgiveness is optional because it is 
inconsistent; that is, it is not "constrained [to] treating like cases 
alike" (159). As long as the resentment is justified, the offender 
cannot complain that previous similar offenses were forgiven. 
However, Heyd's appeal to similar cases is deceptive. Admittedly, 
3 David Heyd, "Moral Subjects, Freedom and Idiosyncrasy ," Human Agency: 
Language. Duty, and Value, Ed. Jonathan Dancy et al. (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 1988) 155. 
4 Heyd, "Moral Subjects. Freedom, and Idiosyncrasy" 158. However . Heyd's 
example of this contextual reasoning is disappointing, to say the least. He evokes 
"the king who declares a general amnesty for criminals on the occasion of a military 
victory or an anniversary [: he] is acting on a reason that is, although impersonal, 
nonetheless typically idiosyncratic, in that it arises only out of a contingent state 
of affairs that it neither captured by any moral rule nor based on the model." Such 
an act might be aesthetically pleasing but I would hesitate to consider it morally 
good. Any moral benefit deriving from such an act would seem to be incidental 
rather than intentional. 
5 Heyd, "Moral Subjects. Freedom, and Idiosyncrasy" 158. 
6 Heyd, "Moral Subjects, Freedom, and Idiosyncrasy" 159. 
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a person could forgive an offender for a particular insult but, if the 
insult recurs, he or she need not forgive it automatically. Yet such 
withholding may not be inconsistent; the cases are not similar in 
that one is not a series. Again, if one person is forgiven for an 
insult, the next offender (of the same act) should not assume 
forgiveness on the same ground, because rarely do two people stand 
in exactly the same relationship to the (potential) forgiver or the 
act. If the cases are similar, and the second offender does stand in 
exactly the same relationship to both the forgiver and the act, then 
the offender might be justified in complaining. For example, one 
child might offend a parent morally and be forgiven; if the next 
child offends the parent in the same way, he or she may be justified 
in complaining if he or she is not similarly forgiven. If forced to 
explain one's seemingly arbitrary decision (not to forgive), one 
would most probably show that the two cases are only superficially 
alike rather than suggest that one has a personal bias in selecting 
one's beneficiary. 
Perhaps Heyd is contending that forgiveness is supererogatory 
only in cases in which the offender has not sought forgiveness. 
Earlier, he has asserted that forgiveness presupposes that the 
offender has acknowledged and taken responsibility for the insult 
or injury. Obviously, this acknowledgment must differ from sincere 
repentance. Such a distinction, however, does not solve Heyd's 
difficulty. One would have difficulty understanding an act of 
forgiveness if the offender admits responsibility, acknowledges the 
hurtful nature of the act, yet professes indifference to its harmful 
effect. Although not impossible, such a case seems unlikely. Instead, 
one would assume that she would take responsibility for the hurtful 
act yet attempt to account for it in some fashion. One must then 
decide whether, in a particular case, forgiveness is permissible. If 
not permissible, then one could say that the forgiver has done 
something wrong. But if permissible, then, given that each case 
must rest on grounds other than the offender's right to forgiveness, 
one can no longer clearly see how such a case might differ from 
the case of sincere repentance. In other words, if it is permissible 
and obligatory to forgive in the case of repentance, then surely 
other good reasons might also serve as the basis for obligations. 
For instance, one might forgive because the friendship with the 
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offender is of such duration that the offending act seems aberrant 
rather than typical behaviour. Consequently, the friend might have 
acceptable (though undisclosed) reasons for her action. 
Finally, Heyd contends that "an act of...forgiveness...which is 
undeserved may be called saintly since, as in other saintly acts of 
supererogation, we feel that we are not in a position even to 
encourage or to urge the agent to supererogate" (163). Heyd can 
hold this position because he contends that acts of forgiveness are 
permissible. For Heyd, the concept of permissibility is "employed 
to bridge the conflicting views we might have regarding the deontic 
status for example of forgiveness or gratitude, which are one the 
one hand thought to be a moral duty, yet are also felt to be optional 
in a way other moral duties are not" (121). 
In any case, to say that acts of forgiveness are permissible does 
not mean that every act of forgiveness is permissible. In Forgiveness 
and Mercy, Jeffrie Murphy, like Heyd, defines forgiveness as a 
giving up of resentment; however, he goes further than Heyd by 
contending that resentment is a reaction to a moral injury to one's 
self-respect. He concludes that the consequence of resentment can 
often be beneficial rather than detrimental. To forgive too readily 
may signal one's lack of self- respect. Not to resent "when our 
rights are violated is to convey—emotionally—either that we do 
not think we have rights or that we do not take our rights very 
seriously. Forgiveness may indeed restore relationships, but to seek 
restoration at all cost—even at the cost of one's human dignity— 
can hardly be a virtue." 7 In other words, resentment is a reaction to 
a moral injury, and when one chooses to forgive or not forgive, one 
does so for moral reasons. Moreover, "if it is proper to feel 
indignation when [one] see[s] third parties morally wronged, must 
it not be equally proper to feel resentment when [one] experience[s] 
the moral wrong done to [oneself]?"8 
Murphy concludes that "forgiveness is acceptable only in cases 
where it is consistent with self-respect, respect for others as 
responsible moral agents, and... [where it does] not involve 
7 Jeffrie G. Murphy, "Forgiveness and Resentment," Forgiveness and Mercy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 17. 
8 Murphy 18. 
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complicity or acquiescence in wrongdoing.'^ Similarly, other 
writers cite cases in which forgiveness is not permissible. Joanna 
North, in her 1987 essay "Wrongdoing and Forgiveness," argues 
that "forgiveness requires that a wrong not be disregarded, 
overlooked, or dismissed" (502). She concludes that such willful 
blindness may indicate moral weakness. 
Jean Hampton in Forgiveness and Mercy, argues that 
forgiveness can sometimes be confused with the related concept of 
'condonation.'io She defines condonation as "the acceptance, 
without moral protest (either inward or outward), of an action which 
ought to warrant such protest, made possible, first, by the ridding 
oneself of the judgement that the action is wrong, so that its 
performer cannot be a wrongdoer, and, second, by ridding oneself 
of any attendant feelings (such as those which are involved in 
resentment) which signify one's protest of the action" (40). The 
decision to "treat the action as not being wrong" would seem to 
contradict Heyd's claim that forgiveness presupposes the wrongness 
of the action. Yet Hampton's examples suggest that the action is 
deemed 'not wrong' because of extenuating circumstances, such 
as a lack of clarity about either the ofifender's intention or the 
circumstances surrounding the action. Thus, the resentment is 
overcome (perhaps even for moral reasons such as the peace of the 
family or love), and personal relationships may be restored, but 
one is condoning rather than forgiving. Hampton argues that the 
close alliance between the acts of forgiving and condoning suggests 
that the conceptual model of forgiveness is at fault. However, 
another possible interpretation of her examples is that forgiveness 
is not always permissible. According to Heyd, when one says that 
a person is wrong to forgive someone, one usually means "that 
[the offender] did not deserve to be forgiven, rather than that [the 
forgiver] did something wrong or blameworthy" (158). I believe 
that the varying views of these philosophers suggest that Heyd is 
9 Murphy 19. 
1 0 The OED defines 'condone' as "to forgive or overlook (an of fence): especially 
to forgive tacitly by not allowing the offence to make any difference in one's 
relations with the offender." Since Hampton differentiates between condoning 
and forgiving, I am assuming that she is emphasizing the notion of overlooking. 
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mistaken. When we say that a person errs in forgiving someone, 
we are implying that the forgiver is at fault. 
Unlike these other writers, Heyd makes no subde distinctions 
between individual acts of forgiving, maintaining that forgiveness 
is always permissible. For Heyd, "resentment—even if it is 
justified—is never a virtue; forgiveness—even if it is undeserved— 
is always a virtue" (162). In his view, forgiveness, being a "shift 
from one level of relationship to another!,] is morally permitted 
and valuable because it is not unjust, because it is good and altruistic 
(the only possible loser being the agent of the act, although unlike 
other cases of sacrifice, the forgiving party cannot strictly speaking 
be described as losing anything)" (162). Heyd's view, however, 
puts forgiveness too squarely in the private realm, where justice 
has traditionally been ignored. 
Heyd and the other writers cited here appear to suggest that 
resentment is easy whereas forgiveness is always difficult. Yet I 
would suggest that the opposite holds true. Self-respect is 
particularly vulnerable to attack and, although a person can feel 
the initial resentment, he or she may be less than sanguine about 
feeling justified in holding such resentment. Especially within 
personal relationships, forgiveness might seem easier than insistence 
on a right that one is not even certain one has. 
Several examples might suggest that Heyd's view of forgiveness 
is too benign. The case of physical abuse within marriage provides 
one such example. A woman might initially resent this injury, so 
much so that she turns to the judicial system. However, out of love 
and her husband's acknowledgement and readiness to take 
responsibility for this hurtful action, she might forgive the beating 
and abort the legal process.The chances are excellent that she will 
later regret her act of forgiveness. Such a case, of course, no longer 
arises because the law has now been made more stringent. The 
woman is no longer allowed the option of speedy forgiveness 
because , if called upon to intervene, The Crown accepts 
responsibility for continuing the process. This change has come 
about not only because of increased understanding about the nature 
of spousal abuse, but also because we recognize the level of respect 
due to a woman within the confines of marriage. Repeated acts of 
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forgiveness can damage a woman's self-esteem severely; therefore, 
she could be described as losing something by her forgiveness. 
Nor can it be said that the one injured is the only one affected 
by an act of forgiveness. For example, one might consider a case 
of sexual harassment in an office. The woman initially resents the 
behaviour but forgives it (perhaps because the offender 
acknowledges the wrong yet confesses to being unable to stop the 
behaviour). Her forgiveness might affect the other women in the 
office. The offender might, for instance, harass another woman 
whose subsequent complaint will be countered with the information 
that other women either do not seem to mind, or if offended, 
nevertheless respond less vindictively. One might also consider 
the attempt to unionize a workplace which has been operating on a 
paternalistic system. A worker might be arbitrarily forced to work 
overtime. The employer might acknowledge the wrong, but remind 
the worker of past benefits. If the worker forgives her employer, 
she might, in the process, be failing in her obligation to her fellow 
workers. The history of union activity is filled with such tales. 
Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, once considered 
the classic novel of forgiveness, is no longer viewed benignly. 
Modern sensibilities contend that Tom's actions constitute race 
betrayal and mimicry, and 'Uncle Tom' is now a pejorative term. 
However personal, acts of moral injury and forgiveness do not take 
place in a vacuum. The claims of justice are surely as relevant in 
the personal as in the public sphere. The act of forgiveness is not, 
as Heyd contends, always "continuous with justice rather than duty," 
especially when used as an alternative to, rather than as a corrective 
of, justice (163). 
Norvin Richards, viewing forgiveness and its alternatives as 
displays of character in his 1988 essay "Forgiveness," holds that 
forgiveness is not always permissible. When permissible, it can be 
either obligatory or supererogatory. The act is supererogatory if 
one's resentment rests on something other than a character defect 
in oneself (for instance, a valid level of self-respect), yet one chooses 
not to act on that resentment. One might forgive because one aspires 
"to be more than merely acceptably kind, or more generous than a 
person need be to rise above the miserly. Such aspirations need not 
collapse into narcissism or involve ignoring traits in greater need 
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of attention" (82). The difficulty with this view, of course, is its 
emphasis on the forgiver to the exclusion of both the relationship 
and the one forgiven. John Wilson, although he does not deal with 
this aspect of forgiveness in his essay "Why Forgiveness Requires 
Repentance," therein suggests a point which should be kept in mind. 
He contends that moral insult or injury involves a breach of trust, 
and asserts further that "restoration of trust necessarily involves 
the restoration of an agreement, which cannot be a unilateral affair" 
(534, Wilson's emphasis). Unlike Wilson, I have suggested that 
more than involving two people, forgiveness and resentment can 
involve one's community as a whole. An act of forgiveness is not 
always permissible because, although improving one's character 
is a virtue, this improvement cannot be done at the expense of others. 
David Heyd's position is that forgiveness is always permissible 
and that, when it is not a duty, it is supererogatory. However, if 
forgiveness rests on something other than the right of the offender, 
one must ask how dutiful forgiveness can be separated conceptually 
from supererogatory forgiveness. Moreover, one can quarrel with 
the notion that forgiving is always permissible. If a particular act 
of forgiveness is not permissible, it cannot be supererogatory if 
performed. Although one would hesitate to endorse easy 
indignation, one could nevertheless allow that forgiveness is not 
always a virtue. 
